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I.

INTRODUCTION

“It is better to buy than to compete.”1 This quote by Mark
Zuckerberg evidences a rising trend in the digital economy over the last
decade. According to the House Judiciary Committee’s report, Investigation
of Competition in Digital Markets, from 2009 to 2019, Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazon (“GAFA”) made more than 300 global
acquisitions combined.2 As of September 2020, the total value of these
four companies was more than $5 trillion.3 In its report, the House
Judiciary Committee also determined that a large percentage of the
acquisitions made by GAFA were either killer acquisitions or nascent
potential competitor acquisitions.4

* Associate, Husch Blackwell LLP | Juris Doctor, The University of Tennessee College
of Law.
1 First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1, Federal
Trade Commission v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021)
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint Against Facebook].
2 SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS
406–446 (2020),
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
While many economists analyze the Big Five—Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and
Microsoft—this paper will focus only Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Id. at 11.
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In this paper, I argue that merger law, as currently construed by
the courts, fails to prevent dominant technology platforms from acquiring
nascent competitive threats and engaging in killer acquisitions.
This issue is timely in that it will not self-correct. Clayton § 7, as
currently interpreted by United States courts, places a nearly impossible
burden of proof on the antitrust enforcement agencies to predict future
anticompetitive outcomes of acquisitions.5 Because of the challenges
associated with meeting the required evidentiary burdens, the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice (the “antitrust enforcement
agencies” or the “agencies”) have been hesitant to challenge acquisitions
by GAFA and have been largely unsuccessful in the few they have
challenged.6 As a result of the law’s underdeterrent effects, legislators
across the country are proposing to expand and amend Clayton § 7 in
hopes of more adequately preventing dominant technology platforms
from engaging in these anticompetitive acquisitions.7
If the issue is left unaddressed, these dominant technology
platforms will continue defending their market positions by acquiring and
killing off start-up companies.8 Such acquisitions have proven harmful to

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
7 Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers, Taking Aim at Big Tech, Push Sweeping Overhaul of Antitrust,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/technology/bigtech-antitrust-bills.html; see also infra Part IV.
8 See infra Part II(d).
5
6
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innovation in that they discourage start-ups from entering the market.9
Without new entrants, innovation competition has waned, allowing
GAFA to abuse consumer data privacy.10 As these dominant platforms
continually gain access to data, they become more powerful and more
equipped to neutralize competitive threats through acquisitions.11 Until
antitrust enforcement agencies have a viable means by which to adequately
challenge acquisitions by dominant technology platforms, these issues will
continue damaging the American digital economy and its consumers.
In Part II of this paper, I define killer acquisitions and acquisitions
of nascent competitive threats, outline how these acquisitions have
harmed the digital economy, explore the specific characteristics of the
digital economy that have made it susceptible to such harms, and cite the
most recent evidence of market dominance by GAFA.
Part III analyzes Clayton § 7, its current interpretation and
application by United States courts, and the difficulties such
interpretations have created in challenging acquisitions by dominant
technology platforms specifically. This part also explores the Federal
Trade

Commission’s

recent

lawsuit

RAGHURAM RAJAN ET AL., KILL ZONE 21, 2 (2021).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
11 See infra Part II(d).
9

10

against

Facebook—which
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retroactively challenged the company’s acquisitions of Instagram and
WhatsApp—and reveals the likely reasons why acquisitions by GAFA
have largely gone unchallenged.
Part IV discusses a recent legislative proposal aimed at deterring
further killer acquisitions and acquisitions of nascent competitive threats
by dominant technology platforms: The Platform Competition and
Opportunity Act of 2021. This part dissects the act, analyzing the ways it
could invigorate antitrust enforcement, its likely impact if it had been
enacted prior to Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, and
the criticisms it will likely face.
Lastly, Part V concludes this paper.
II.

ANTICOMPETITIVE ACQUISITIONS AND THE
DOWNFALL OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon have used killer acquisitions
and acquisitions of nascent competitive threats to increase their market
dominance and neutralize competitive threats.12 The use of such
anticompetitive acquisitions has weakened innovation in the digital
economy, harming both entrepreneurs and consumers and making entry
into the market nearly impossible.13

12
13

See infra Part II(d).
See infra Part II(b)-(c).
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A. KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND ACQUISITIONS OF NASCENT
COMPETITIVE THREATS
Killer acquisitions take place when a dominant firm “acquire[s] an
innovative target and terminate[s] the development of the target’s
innovations to preempt future competition.”14 Alternatively, a dominant
firm might acquire a target company and then “kill-off its own internal
efforts to develop a competing product,” thereby removing the potential
risk of competition to its newly acquired subsidiary.15
Acquisitions of nascent competitive threats, on the other hand,
take place when a dominant firm acquires “young firms with products or
services whose competitive significance remains highly uncertain.”16 The
competitive significance of such young firms is uncertain either because
their presence in existing markets overlaps only slightly with that of the

COLLEEN CUNNINGHAM ET AL., KILLER ACQUISITIONS 1 (2020),
https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=75602107202412209612408309500201
706901503200905105400402200711802503112409409606607800705200302303001405
509112510610809207112605602208803209312708312308607908803007103300409109
208210901007408509209902107508309410011212706609502808602207207010512609
4&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE.COLLEEN CUNNINGHAM ET AL., KILLER
ACQUISITIONS 1 (2020),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=37409601300109612311911808207112
106910107301002806102510008003002901309308503100800003203003300811111100
702511600508012700311504405703700604708300101908507700807600001104903012
210709409409308712407100207111912211000412111900608301712007501811607211
9&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE.
15 CHRIS PIKE, START-UPS, KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND MERGER CONTROL 6 (2020),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2020)5/en/pdf [hereinafter OECD
REPORT].
16 Id.
14
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dominant firm or because they do not currently overlap with the dominant
firm but have the potential to do so in the future.17 In these situations, the
dominant firm is concerned that a young firm might eventually grow its
product into a competitive threat.18 Thus, by acquiring the young firm
before its product becomes a rival, the dominant firm can minimize the
potential of future competitive harm and use the young firm’s product to
further its business.19
These two types of acquisitions have allowed dominant
technology platforms to gain more power through greater market
dominance.20 The more powerful these few companies become, the more
harm that will be caused to both entrepreneurs and consumers.
B. COMPETITIVE HARMS AND THE IMPACT ON ENTREPRENEURS
AND CONSUMERS

Market dominance by GAFA, as is being achieved through killer
acquisitions and acquisitions of nascent competitive threats, has been
harmful to entrepreneurs and consumers in two major ways. First,
GAFA’s market dominance has weakened innovation such that it has
created a “kill zone” where dominant technology platforms are insulated
“from competitive pressure simply because investors do not see new

Id.
Id. at 7.
19 Id.
20 See infra Part II(d).
17
18

2022]

Killer Acquisitions

67

entrants as worthwhile investments.”21 Second, GAFA’s market
dominance has led to inadequate privacy and data protections for
consumers.22
i. Weakened Innovation and the Creation of a Kill Zone
Competition is vitally important to innovation because it forces
companies to continually improve their products and services, lest
consumers switch to competitors that offer more attractive choices.23
Often, new entrants into the market spur innovation competition.24 Startup companies enter the market with new ideas, requiring pre-existing
market participants to either improve their products and services or lose
customers.25
GAFA’s market dominance in the digital economy, as obtained
through the use of killer acquisitions and acquisitions of nascent
competitive threats, has allowed it to drive start-ups out of the market.26
As Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon have continued acquiring new
market entrants, the digital economy has seen a “sharp decline in new

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2 at 18, 46.https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555915.
Id. at 51–52.
23 Id. at 46.
24 KEN BUCK, THE THIRD WAY: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN BIG TECH 10 (2020)
[hereinafter BUCK REPORT].
https://buck.house.gov/sites/buck.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/Buck%20Rep
ort.pdf
25 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46.
26 Id.
21
22
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business formation as well as early-stage start-up funding.”27 The House
Judiciary Committee’s report notes that the “entrepreneurship rate” in the
technology industry has declined from 60% in 1982 to 38% in 2011.28 The
decline of new entrants in the digital market has led to decreased
innovation competition, allowing the dominant technology platforms to
control innovation “rather than being creatively spread across directions
chosen by entrants.”29 As is discussed further in subsection (ii), the lack of
competitive pressure, and GAFA’s control of innovation in the digital
economy has led to inadequate privacy protections for consumers.30
This lack of innovation competition has also created what
economists refer to as a “kill zone,” where venture capitalists are
discouraged from investing in digital market entrants and, in turn,
entrepreneurs are discouraged from attempting to enter the digital
marketplace.31 First, venture capitalists are discouraged from investing
because GAFA possesses monopoly power that a new entrant is highly
unlikely to overcome due to the unique characteristics of the digital
market.32 Second, venture capitalists are discouraged from investing

Id.
Id. at 47.
29 See id. at 50 (quoting Innovation and Entrepreneurship Hearings at 81 (statement of Fiona
Scott Morton, Theodore Nierenberg Prof. of Econ. Yale Sch. of Mgmt.).
30 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 50−52; UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, infra
note 52, at 50; see also infra Part II(b)(ii).
31 RAJAN, supra note 9, at 2.
32 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48 (quoting Venture Capital and Antitrust Workshop
Transcript at 24 (statement of Paul Arnold, Founder & Partner, Switch Partners)).
27
28
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because of the likelihood that a new entrant will be acquired by GAFA.33
When antitrust authorities fail to block a merger by one of the dominant
technology platforms, “it signals that there is a higher likelihood that other
similar acquisitions will not be blocked.”34 In their paper, “Kill Zone,”
Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales, and Sai Krishna Kamepalli note that,
“[i]n the three years following an acquisition by Google or Facebook in a
certain industry sector, [venture capital] investments in that sector . . . drop
by over 40%.”35
They argue that this issue is exacerbated by the multi-sided nature
of digital platforms.36 Digital platforms serve customers on one side and
advertisers on the other.37 Customers are not charged monetary fees to use
digital platforms, thus, customers are incentivized to adopt a new digital
platform through network effects.38 Network effects, as is discussed in
subsection (c), exist when a product becomes more valuable as it is used
by more people.39 Here, customer incentive to adopt a new digital platform

RAJAN, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 2.
35 Id. at 2.
36 Id. at 3; see also UFUK AKCIGIT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RISING
CORPORATE MARKET POWER: EMERGING POLICY ISSUES 25
(2021)https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-DiscussionNotes/Issues/2021/03/10/Rising-Corporate-Market-Power-Emerging-Policy-Issues48619 [hereinafter IMF REPORT].
37 RAJAN, supra note 9, at 3.
38 Id. at 3.
39 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40; see also infra Part II(c).
33
34
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depends largely on adoption by early app developers.40 When a new digital
platform, such as a social media platform, enters the market, early app
developers can adopt the platform by adapting their apps to be compatible
with the platform.41 As more app developers’ applications become
compatible with a new platform, ordinary consumers are incentivized to
use that platform as well.42
However, when an app developer anticipates that a new digital
platform will rapidly be acquired by a dominant technology firm, they are
discouraged from investing their time and resources into adopting the
platform.43 This dilemma exists because when an entrant platform is
acquired by a dominant platform like GAFA, the dominant platform
integrates the new platform into its existing technology.44 Thus, any app
developers’ apps that were already compatible with the dominant platform
will automatically become compatible with the acquired entrant platform
as well.45 Because app developers have come to anticipate mergers soon
after a platform’s entry into the market, they have been slow to adopt the

RAJAN, supra note 9, at 3.
Id. at 3.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 4.
44 Id.
45 Id.
40
41
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new platforms.46 As a result, ordinary customers are not incentivized to
adopt the new platform.47
The decline of investment and entry into the digital market has
allowed dominant technology platforms to face very little competition.48
Without competition incentivizing improvement, innovation has stalled.49
The decline in innovation and the devastating impacts this decline has on
the digital economy can be seen in the inadequate privacy protections
being offered by GAFA.50
ii. Inadequate Privacy Protections
Market power is typically defined as “the ability to raise prices
without a loss to demand.”51 However, because digital platforms typically
do not charge monetary fees to customers, market power takes a different
form.52 Rather than impacting prices charged, market power in the digital

Id.
Id. at 3.
48 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46–47
.
49 Id. at 47.
50 Id. at 52 (quoting Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Data Protection in
Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy through Competition?, 8 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. &
PRACTICE 363, 365 (2017)).
51 Id. at 51. (citing W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 164 (3d ed. 2000)).
52 Id.; see also THE DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL
COMPETITION 4 (2019),
.https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf
46
47
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market impacts “the degree to which platforms have eroded consumer
privacy without prompting a response from the market.”53
Absent competitive threats, dominant technology platforms are
not motivated to offer sufficient privacy protections.54 Dominant
platforms then benefit from the lack of customer privacy protections
because, in turn, the platform has greater access to customer data.55

The

House Judiciary Committee’s report noted that dominant technology
platforms have abused customer privacy by hiding their data collection
practices “in

dense and lengthy disclosures,” by tricking customers into

consenting to tracking through “[t]he use of manipulative design
interfaces,” and by using customers’ personal data for personalized
advertising “with no or limited controls available to consumers.”56 As is
discussed further

below, access to data allows dominant platforms to

maintain and increase their market power.57 Thus, start-ups that attempt
to enter the digital market and offer more rigorous privacy protections for

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 51
Id. at 52; see also UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 52, at 50.
55 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 52.
56 Id. at 52–53. (quoting Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 50, at 365; and then citing
Arvind Narayanan, Arunesh Mathur, Marshini Chetty & Mihir Kshirsagar, Dark
Patterns: Past, Present, and Future, 18(2) ACM QUEUE 67, 77 (2020)
https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3400901).
57Id. at 44; see also discussion infra Part II(c).
53
54
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customers are disadvantaged by their lack of access to data and are driven
out by the dominant platforms.58
The unique characteristics of the digital market, some of which
have already been discussed, have made it especially vulnerable to these
competitive harms.59
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIGITAL MARKET
Digital markets are uniquely susceptible to the previously
discussed competitive harms because, in addition to containing multisided platforms,60 they are characterized by strong network effects, high
switching costs, data accumulation, and economies of scale and scope.61
i. Network Effects
Direct network effects exist when a product or service becomes
more valuable as more people use that product or service.62 For example,
Facebook becomes more valuable to the individual user when more of the
user’s family members and friends are also on Facebook.63 Similarly,
Amazon Marketplace becomes more valuable as more buyers and sellers
use the platform because buyers have access to a greater range of products,

58 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; see also UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION,
supra note 52, at 4.
59 See infra Part II(c).
60 Rajan et al., supra note 9, at 3.
61 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40–46; IMF Report, supra note 36, at 25.
62 Id. at 40
.
63 Id. at 41
.
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and sellers are more likely to sell their products.64 Direct network effects
in digital markets facilitate monopoly formation because they make it
difficult for newcomers to enter the market and adequately compete.65 A
new social media platform, online marketplace, or search engine can only
effectively compete if it has enough users to make its service valuable.66
Because digital markets are characterized by these strong network
effects, they are “subject to ‘tipping’ in which a winner will take most of
the market.”67 As discussed above, direct network effects and tipping
facilitate the “kill zone” because when investors and early app developers
are discouraged from investing in a new digital platform, ordinary
customers are unlikely to adopt the platform.68 Without such early
adoption by customers, a digital platform is unlikely to stand a chance at
competing with GAFA.69
ii.

Switching Costs

Digital markets are also characterized by high switching costs,
meaning that users face difficulties in switching away from a dominant
firm’s product to a new product.70 For example, users who engage with
Facebook contribute a significant amount of time and data to building

Id.
Id.
66 Id.
67 UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 52, at 4.
68 See supra Part II(b)(i).
69 Rajan et al., supra note 9, at 3.
70 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
64
65
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their profiles, connecting with friends, uploading pictures, and sharing
personal information.71 If a user decides to switch to a different social
network, they cannot import their Facebook profile into that new
network; instead, they must “start from scratch, re-uploading [] photos
and re-entering [] personal information to the new platform.”72 Similar
difficulties exist for sellers on Amazon, as they cannot easily transfer their
Amazon product reviews and ratings to a new online marketplace.73
These high switching costs create “lock-in,” where users remain
with the dominant firm out of convenience, even though they would
prefer to switch to another firm’s product or service.74 Lock-in is another
significant barrier to entry for start-up firms in the digital market.75
iii.

Data Accumulation

Data accumulation is an essential part of competing in the digital
market.76 Data accumulation is “self-reinforcing.”77 Companies with
access to large amounts of data can “use that data to better target users or
improve product quality,” thus attracting more users, which allows the

Id. at 42.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 41–42
.
75 Id. at 42.
76 Id. at 43; see also IMF Report, supra note 36, at 26.
77 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
71
72
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company to accumulate more data.78 This “advantageous feedback loop”
poses a significant barrier to entry for new firms that have few users and
minimal access to data.79 Additionally, data advantages assist dominant
platforms in identifying and acquiring rivals before they become
significant competitive threats.80 As noted in the House Judiciary
Committee’s report—Google has used Android’s operating system to
track third-party apps, Facebook has used its platform to “identify and
then acquire fast-growing third-party apps,” and Amazon has used data
from third-party merchants to “inform [its] own private label strategy.”81
Additionally, Apple has been pre-installing its “Find My” app, an app that
tracks the phone’s location, on iPhones, in such a way that users can only
opt out of the location tracking if they go through the phone’s extensive
menu settings.82
In turn, dominant technology platforms are not motivated to
provide adequate privacy protections for consumers, and, without
innovation competition from market entrants, dominant platforms
continue gaining power despite the inadequacy of the protections they
offer.83

Id.
Id. at 42–43.
80 Id. at 44.
81 Id. at 378.
82 Id. at 357.
83 Id. at 51; see also IMF Report, supra note 36, at 24–25.
78
79

2022]

Killer Acquisitions

iv.

77

Economies of Scale and Scope

Finally, digital markets are susceptible to monopolization because
of economies of scale and scope.84 Entry into digital markets is expensive
on the front end, but successful entrants enjoy increasing returns to scale,
meaning that “as [their] sales increase, [the] average unit cost decreases.”85
For example, Facebook faced significant upfront costs in the construction
of its platform but does not face increasing costs as more users join the
platform.86 Instead, its average unit cost decreases with each new user it
gains.87 Dominant technology platforms also enjoy economies of scope in
that, once a firm has “sufficient technical expertise or access to consumer
data, the cost of applying this resource into a new market is relatively
low.”88 While many dominant technology platforms do not charge money
for their consumer services, they benefit significantly from the
accumulation of user data.89 This data accumulation makes it easier for
dominant firms to maintain their market shares while simultaneously
creating an incredibly high cost of entry for start-up firms.90

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 45; see also IMF Report, supra note 36, at 25.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 45.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 45–46.
90 Id.
84
85
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These four characteristics have made the digital market uniquely
susceptible to competitive harm and have facilitated Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazons’ accumulation of market power.91
d.

EVIDENCE OF MARKET DOMINANCE BY GAFA

Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon each benefitted from being
early entrants into the digital market. As these dominant platforms have
developed their products and accumulated data over the last several years,
the unique evolving characteristics of the digital economy have allowed
them to maintain their dominant positions and have facilitated their
acquisitions of start-up firms before such firms could grow into legitimate
competitors.92 Recent statistics from the House Judiciary Committee’s
report show that much of GAFA’s growth over the years is attributable to
the firms’ uses of acquisitions.93
First, the House Judiciary Committee report showed that Google
has acquired over 260 companies in twenty years.94 Google dominates the
online search market, making up over 87% of U.S. searches and over 92%
of global searches.95

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40–46.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40–46.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 174.
95 Id. at 176.
91
92
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Next, the Committee found that Apple has acquired over 100
companies in the last twenty years.96 In 2019, Apple’s CEO Tim Cook
stated that Apple buys a new company every two to three weeks and that
Apple’s “approach on acquisitions has been to buy companies where
[they] have challenges, and IP, and then make them a feature of the
phone.”97
Concerning Facebook, the Committee found that the company
has acquired at least 63 companies since its founding in 2004, including
Instagram, WhatsApp, Atlas, LiveWire, and Onavo.98 Facebook has
maintained an extremely high market share, with its products making up
three of the seven most popular apps in the United States.99 Additionally,
Facebook’s senior executives have called Facebook’s acquisition strategy
a “land grab” to “shore up [their] position,” evidencing their intention to
use acquisitions as means by which to avoid competitive threats.100
Lastly, the Committee found that Amazon has acquired over 100
companies in the last twenty years.101 Amazon made several large
acquisitions in recent years, including Ring, Zappos, IMDB.com, Audible,

Id. at 414–423.
Id. at 337.
98 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 149.
99 Id. at 136.
100 Id. at 149.
101 Id. at 261.
96
97
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and Goodreads, with its largest acquisition occurring in 2017 when it
purchased Whole Foods for $13.7 billion.102
Laws aimed at limiting anticompetitive mergers certainly exist.103
However, the interpretation of such laws in U.S. courts has created an
environment where dominant technology platforms can engage in
anticompetitive mergers with very little accountability.104
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF CLAYTON § 7
a. CLAYTON § 7

Section 7 of the Clayton Act currently addresses acquisitions by
dominant firms.105 Enacted in 1914 and last amended in 1996, Clayton § 7
prohibits mergers or acquisitions that may have the effect of substantially
lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly.106 The statute
applies to acquisitions of stock, assets, or non-corporate interests and
exempts certain acquisitions, including those solely for investment.107
Additionally, the Hart-Scott Rodino Act, also known as Clayton Act §
7A, establishes notification requirements and a waiting period for persons
that plan to acquire the stock or assets of another.108 The statute imposes

Id. at 262.
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (West 2000); 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (West 2000).
104 See infra Part III. See infra note 121; see also Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730,
731–32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18).
105 15 U.S.C. § 18.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7A, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a).
102
103
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these requirements upon large acquisitions meeting specific criteria under
subsection (a).109 Firms whose acquisitions are subject to this act must file
a notification with the Federal Trade Commission.110 During the following
thirty-day waiting period, the Federal Trade Commission or Department
of Justice reviews the notification and may request additional information
to ensure that the acquisition will not violate antitrust laws, including
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.111 If the reviewing agency believes that a
proposed merger may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly, and the parties cannot resolve such concerns, the agency may
attempt to prevent the merger by going to federal court.112
b. INTERPRETATIONS OF CLAYTON § 7
i. Historical Application of Clayton §§ 7 and 7A
Historically, federal courts interpreted Clayton § 7 in such a way that
emphasized the statute’s use of the word “may,” holding that the antitrust
enforcement agencies could prohibit mergers or acquisitions that “may
have the effect of substantially lessening competition or tending to create
a monopoly,” and not requiring that the agencies prove that a merger or

Id.
Id.
111 Id.
112 Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (last visited Sept. 18, 2022).
109
110
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acquisition definitely would create such anticompetitive effects.113 In
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the District Court’s holding that a merger between two producers
of aluminum conductor would not violate Clayton § 7.114 In its decision,
the Supreme Court emphasized that Clayton § 7 is concerned with
“‘probabilities, not certainties.’”115 The Supreme Court held that, although
Alcoa’s acquisition of Rome would add only 1.3% to Alcoa’s control of
the aluminum conductor market, such an acquisition would be reasonably
likely to produce “substantial lessening of competition within the meaning
of [Clayton] § 7” given the fact that the aluminum conductor market was
already highly concentrated.116 The Supreme Court emphasized that “‘if
concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual
deconcentration is correspondingly great.’”117
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America created a reasonable burden
for antitrust agencies to carry in challenging potential mergers.118

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 272–73, 280 (1964)
(emphasis added).
114 Id. at 273, 281.
115 Id. at 280 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 279. (quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365,
n. 42 (1963).
118 Id. at 272–73.
113
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Unfortunately, reliance on the case has greatly waned in recent years.119
Since 2011, courts have cited the case only four times, with no case
relying on the standard the Supreme Court set forward.120 Instead, federal
courts have tended toward a much more rigorous burden of proof for
antitrust agencies seeking to challenge a merger.121
ii. Modern Application of Clayton §§ 7 and 7A
Modern federal courts now require the Federal Trade Commission
and Department of Justice to present extensive evidence in proving that a
merger is likely to violate Clayton § 7.122 For example, in Federal Trade
Commission v. Tronox Ltd., the Federal Trade Commission was required to
meet three evidentiary burdens in making its case that a merger between
Tronox Limited and Cristal, two titanium dioxide producers, would be
violative of Clayton § 7.123 First, the agency had to demonstrate the
relevant product market.124 Second, the agency had to demonstrate the

119 See infra, note 120. See DeHoog v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, 899 F.3d 758,
764 (9th Cir. 2018); Universal Surveillance Corp. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., No. 5:11-CV1755, 2015 WL 6082122 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2015); Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 762 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v. Lab'y Corp. of Am.,
No. SACV 10-1873 AG MLGX, 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011).
120 See supra note 119.
121 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d 187, 198 (D.D.C. 2018); see also
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010),
HTTPS://WWW.FTC.GOV/SYSTEM/FILES/DOCUMENTS/PUBLIC_STATEMENTS/804291/
100819HMG.PDF.
122 Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 197; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121, at
1.
123 Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 197.
124 Id.
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relevant geographic market.125 Third, the agency had to demonstrate that
the proposed merger “would substantially increase concentration.”126
A challenging aspect of identifying the relevant product market is
that the agency had to prove that it was not defining the market too
narrowly.127 In arguing that the relevant product market was the market
for chloride-process titanium dioxide, the agency presented evidence
showing that consumers recognize chloride-process titanium dioxide as a
product separate from sulfate-process titanium dioxide.128 Using factors
established in Brown Shoe Co., v. United States, the agency set forth
information showing chloride-process titanium dioxide’s unique
characteristics, the distinct customers that use it, the price differences
between it and sulfate-process titanium dioxide, and more.129
In its argument that North America was the relevant geographic
market, the agency had to present extensive quantitative evidence showing
the existence of regional markets, as opposed to one global market.130 In
doing so, the agency brought in an expert witness who explained the
agency’s “Hypothetical Monopolist Test” results.131 The Hypothetical
Monopolist Test determines that “a proposed market is sufficiently broad

Id.
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 198
.
128 Id. at 198–99.
129 Id. at 198; see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
130 Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 203.
131 Id. at 204; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121, at 8.
125
126
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if an absolute monopolist of the posited market would likely find it profitmaximizing to impose a [small but significant] non-transitory price
increase [(“SSNIP”)] of at least 5%.”132 The agency found that with a
SSNIP of 10%, a hypothetical monopolist in the North American
chloride-process titanium dioxide market could lose up to 15.4% of its
sales and still break even.133 Because this critical loss calculation of 15.4%
was less than the calculated predicted loss the agency set forward, the court
accepted the agency’s argument that the North American market was the
correct geographic market.134
Lastly, to meet its third burden of proof, the Federal Trade
Commission had to present additional expert witness testimony and
extensive economic evidence in order to calculate and prove the market
participants’ shares in the relevant product and geographic markets.135 The
agency then determined the relevant market’s concentration level by
calculating its Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (“HHI”) score by squaring
the market share of each firm in a market and adding the values.136 Next,

132 ELHAUGE GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 352 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2018); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010).
133 Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 204.
134 Id. at 204–06.
135 Id. at 207–09.
136 Id. at 207; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010).
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the agency presented evidence showing that if the merger were to go
through, the HHI score of the chloride-process titanium dioxide market
would be 3,046, shifting the market from “moderately concentrated” to
“highly concentrated.”137 Finally, the agency also presented evidence
showing that post-merger strategic output withholding was likely.138
While the Federal Trade Commission was able to successfully
meet its evidentiary burdens and ultimately won the Tronox case, blocking
the merger between Tronox and Cristal,139 this heightened and detailed
standard has proved extremely difficult for the agencies to meet in other
cases.140 In many ways, it is as if courts now require evidence that a merger
will certainly prove anticompetitive.141 This rigorous burden has led to fewer
merger challenges by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission.142 For example, in 2018, the Department of Justice lost its
case against AT&T, wherein it challenged AT&T’s $108 billion vertical
merger with Time Warner, because the court held that the agency failed
to establish that the merger was likely to substantially lessen competition.143

Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
139 Id. at 219–20;
140 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2021);
United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).
141 Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 207–09.
142 UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 52, at 91.
143 AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 161. (emphasis added).
137
138
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This was the first vertical merger challenge the Department of Justice had
brought in over forty years.144
As for the dominant technology platforms, the Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice have not proactively challenged a
single GAFA acquisition in court.145 This is likely because the heightened
evidentiary burden is especially difficult to meet when analyzing digital
platforms.146 Such challenges can be understood more fully in light of the
Federal Trade Commission’s recent lawsuit against Facebook.
c. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. FACEBOOK
The Federal Trade Commission’s recent, unsuccessful lawsuit
against Facebook reveals that unique challenges in defining the relevant
product market for and market share of digital platforms are the likely
reasons why the antitrust enforcement agencies have failed to challenge
GAFA acquisitions.147

Mark McCareins, AT&T-Time Warner Ruling a Milestone for Vertical Mergers, THE HILL,
June 14, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/392158-att-time-warner-ruling-awatershed-moment-for-vertical-mergers.
145 UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 52, at 91.
146 See infra Part III(c).
147 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d.
144
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i. Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram
Facebook acquired Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion.148 As of 2021,
the Facebook-Instagram merger is the only Facebook acquisition that the
Federal Trade Commission has investigated.149 Despite its investigation,
the Federal Trade Commission did not challenge the merger.150 In 2021,
however, the Federal Trade Commission initiated litigation against
Facebook, arguing that, by acquiring and continuing to own Instagram,
the company is illegally maintaining a monopoly in violation of Sherman
Act § 2.151 The Federal Trade Commission brought this complaint under
Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which “authorizes it
to seek an injunction against an entity that ‘is violating’ or ‘is about to
violate’ the antitrust laws.”152
In its initial complaint against Facebook, the Federal Trade
Commission alleged that, as of 2011, Facebook had become the
“dominant personal social networking provider in the United States.”153
However, as smartphones became more popular, Facebook’s executives
worried that new apps would compete with Facebook for users.154 Because
Facebook originated as a website and its mobile functionality was limited,

Id. at 3–4.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
150 UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 52, at 91.
151 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 11.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 6
.
154 Id. at 6-7.
148
149
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the company feared that emerging app-based social networking services
would surpass Facebook.155
Facebook executives were especially concerned about competition
spurred by Instagram, a “photo-editing and -sharing app designed for the
era of smartphones with built-in cameras,” whose user base was growing
rapidly.156 Because Instagram’s model as a photo-sharing social network
differed from Facebook’s, Facebook initially attempted to compete by
creating its own photo-sharing app, “Snap.”157 Instagram continued
growing rapidly while Facebook was attempting to develop its own app,
and Facebook became increasingly worried that a direct competitor, like
Google, Apple, or Twitter, would acquire Instagram.158 Facebook
eventually shifted away from its own photo-sharing app development and
began negotiations to acquire Instagram.159
Facebook successfully acquired Instagram in April of 2012 and,
less than two weeks later, began scaling back on the development of its
own app, eventually abandoning the project altogether.160 Facebook’s

Id. at 7.
Id.
157 Id.; First Amended Complaint Against Facebook, supra note 1, at 27.
158 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 7; First Amended Complaint Against Facebook,
supra note 1, at 27–8.
159 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 7; First Amended Complaint Against Facebook,
supra note 1, at 28.
160 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 7-8; First Amended Complaint Against Facebook,
supra note 1, at 33.
155
156
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acquisition of Instagram can be categorized as a killer acquisition in that
Facebook acquired Instagram and “killed off its own internal efforts to
develop a competing product.”161 The Federal Trade Commission’s
complaint against Facebook specifically argued that Facebook was
maintaining a monopoly in the market for personal social networking
(“PSN”) services by its acquisition and continued ownership of
Instagram.162 Defining PSN services as “online services that enable and
are used by people to maintain personal relationships and share
experiences with friends, family, and other personal connections in a
shared space,” the Federal Trade Commission stated that Facebook has a
monopoly in the relevant market because there are no other types of
internet services that are adequate substitutes for Facebook.163 Instagram
previously served as a competitor in the PSN services market until
Facebook acquired it, neutralizing its threat.164
Despite the Federal Trade Commission’s arguments, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim, holding that the Federal Trade Commission did
not adequately plead that Facebook possessed monopoly power in the
PSN services market.165 Specifically, the court held that the agency’s
OECD REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d, at 4.
163 Id. at 14.
164 Id. at 7.
165 Id. at 7, 12–13.
161
162
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complaint failed to show that Facebook holds market power in the PSN
services market.166 The court’s opinion stated that the agency’s evidence
was “too conclusory” because they did not provide an “estimated actual
figure or range for Facebook’s market share” but simply stated that
Facebook’s market share had been in excess of 60% of the PSN services
market since 2011.167 The court went on to explain the existing difficulties
in measuring Facebook’s market power.168 Its market power cannot be
measured by revenue, because revenues earned by PSN services are earned
in the market for advertising, which is a separate market.169 Facebook’s
market power also cannot be measured by its share of the total number of
users of PSN services because this figure would not account for users who
are part of multiple PSN services.170 Lastly, the court stated that
Facebook’s market share cannot be measured by its share of the total time
that users spend on PSN services because this metric would not account
for features offered by Facebook or Instagram that could be characterized
as “non-PSN services,” such as watching an online video.171

Id. at 4 .
Id. at 18 .
168 Id. at 19.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
166
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The dismissal of the Federal Trade Commission’s complaint,
along with the court’s analysis of the difficulties in measuring Facebook’s
market share, are very likely the reasons why the agency did not challenge
the merger in 2012. As discussed previously, digital platforms are multisided markets where customers are not charged monetary fees, and
revenues are earned in a separate advertising market.172 Because customers
“pay” for digital platform services in the form of data, it can be extremely
difficult to measure a particular platform’s market share.173 Additionally,
as discussed previously, in reviewing merger challenges under Clayton § 7,
courts have become more demanding, requiring the Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice to present detailed evidence of
the relevant market, the merging firms’ market shares, and the likely
market concentration and anticompetitive effects that would result from
the merger.174 In the relevant case, the Federal Trade Commission had the
benefit of being able to access almost ten years of post-merger activity and
statistics in making its arguments, yet it still failed to meet the court’s
evidentiary requirements.175 Had the agency attempted to challenge
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012, it is very likely that it would

Kill Zone, supra note 9, at 2; see also IMF Report, supra note 36, at 25.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 51; Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 13.
174 Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 198–209.
175 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 1.
172
173
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have had an even harder time meeting its burden of proof because it would
have had the additional burden of predicting the outcomes of the merger.
ii. Facebook’s Acquisition of WhatsApp
Facebook acquired WhatsApp in 2014 for $19 billion.176 Once
again, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice did not
challenge the merger, but in its 2021 complaint against Facebook, the
Federal Trade Commission also accused the company of monopoly
maintenance by its acquisition and continued ownership of WhatsApp.177
The agency’s attack on the WhatsApp merger differed from the
Instagram merger in that WhatsApp was not a competitor in the PSN
services market.178 Instead, the agency argued that Facebook feared
WhatsApp, which was part of the mobile messaging services market,
might become a competitor in the PSN services market.179 Like Instagram,
WhatsApp was an app-based platform gaining popularity with the rise of
smartphones.180 In an initial attempt to compete, Facebook released its
Facebook Messenger app, hoping that it would slow the growth of
WhatsApp, preventing WhatsApp from expanding into the PSN services

Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 52, at 91; Facebook, Inc., 560 F.
Supp. 3d at 9.
178 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
179 Id.
180 Id.
176
177
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market.181 But to Facebook’s dismay, WhatsApp continued growing,
reaching 450 million active users by 2014.182 Driven by fear of
competition, Facebook began attempts to neutralize the threat through an
acquisition.183 After failed negotiations in 2012, Facebook successfully
acquired WhatsApp in 2014.184 Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp can
be categorized as an acquisition of a nascent competitive threat in that
Facebook acquired WhatsApp to neutralize the potential that WhatsApp
might develop into a PSN services competitor in the future.185
The Federal Trade Commission argued that, since the acquisition,
Facebook had maintained its monopoly in the PSN services market by
keeping WhatsApp “‘cabined to providing mobile messaging services
rather than allowing’ it to grow into a standalone PSN service.”186 As
mentioned previously, the Federal Trade Commission’s complaint was
ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim.187 The District Court’s
dismissal of the complaint cited the same reasoning for dismissing both
the Instagram and WhatsApp merger arguments: the Federal Trade
Commission failed to show that Facebook holds power in the PSN
services market and the agency failed to present an actual figure or range

Id.
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 157.
185 OECD REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
186 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
187 Id. at 12.
181
182
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for Facebook’s market share.188189 Given the court’s insistence on
quantitative data and hard evidence of market power,190 it is highly unlikely
that, in 2014, the court would not have accepted an argument that the
merger was anticompetitive because WhatsApp could and might someday
enter the PSN services market. This dilemma further enables dominant
technology platforms in their acquisitions of nascent competitive threats
because the anticompetitive effects are very difficult to prove under the
current interpretation of Clayton § 7 and Sherman § 2.191
Because of the challenges of proving the relevant product market and
market share of digital platforms, especially those that are nascent
competitors, the antitrust enforcement agencies have been extremely
hesitant in challenging GAFA acquisitions.192 Even in its retroactive
challenges of acquisitions, the Federal Trade Commission has been
unsuccessful.193 Courts’ interpretations of the relevant laws must be
refined if such anticompetitive acquisitions are to be prevented.

Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 4.
190 Id. at 12–13.
191 See infra Part IV.
192 See supra Part III.
193 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d.
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RESTORATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE CHANGE

Recognition of the need for change in antitrust enforcement has
been growing rapidly over the last two years.194 Both Republican and
Democratic politicians have acknowledged the need for legislation that
reinforces anticompetitive presumptions on certain behaviors by
dominant platforms and lowers evidentiary burdens for antitrust agencies
in court.195 In June of 2021, as sponsored by Congressman Hakeem
Jeffries, the “Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021” was
introduced before the House of Representatives.196 Later that month, the
Committee on the Judiciary voted to issue a report to the full chamber.197
More recently, in November of 2021, Senator Amy Klobuchar introduced
a companion bill before the Senate.198 This paper will analyze Senator
Klobuchar’s companion bill in detail, though the language of the two bills
is nearly identical.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 376–403; Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers, Taking Aim at Big
Tech, Push Sweeping Overhaul of Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2021.
195 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 376–403; see also BUCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
196 H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021).
197 Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3826/text.
198 Klobuchar, Cotton Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect Competition and Consumer Choice
Online, AMY KLOBUCHAR (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/11/klobuchar-cottonintroduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-protect-competition-and-consumer-choice-online.
194
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a. THE PLATFORM COMPETITION AND OPPORTUNITY ACT OF
2021
The Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021 (“the
Platform Act”) seeks to “promote competition and economic opportunity
in digital markets by establishing that certain acquisitions by dominant
online platforms are unlawful.”199 This legislation shifts the burden of
proof from the antitrust enforcement agencies to the “covered platform”
seeking to acquire the stock or assets of another.200 A “covered platform”
is defined as an online platform that has met certain criteria pertaining to
its number of monthly active users and market capitalization as well as
being “a critical trading partner for the sale or provision of any service
offered on or directly related to the platform.”201 Additionally, a “covered

S. 3197, 117th Cong. (2021).
Id.
201 Id. (stating “The term ‘covered platform’ means an online platform (1) that has been
designated as a ‘covered platform’ under section 4(a); or (2) that (A) at any point during
the 12 months preceding a designation under section 4(a) or at any point during the 12
months preceding the filing of a complaint for an alleged violation of this Act (i) has at
least 50,000,000 United States-based monthly active users on the online platform
operator; or (ii) has at least 100,000 United States-based monthly active business users
on the online platform; (B) as of the date of enactment of this Act, was owned or
controlled by a person with United States net annual sales of $600,000,000,000 in the
prior calendar year or with a market capitalization of greater than $600,000,000,000, as
measured by the simple average of the closing price per share of the common stock
issued by the person for the trading days in the 180-day period ending on the date of
enactment of this Act; and (C) is a critical trading partner for the sale or provision of
any product or service offered on or directly related to the online platform.”).
199
200
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platform operator” is defined as a person that “owns or controls a covered
platform.”202
Under the Platform Act, it would be deemed unlawful for a covered
platform operator to acquire the stock or assets of another person engaged
in commerce, either directly or indirectly, unless the covered platform could
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the transaction
would be exempt under Clayton § 7A(c),203 (2) the acquired stock or assets
are valued at less than $50,000,000, or (3) the acquired assets or stock
would not: (a) “compete with the covered platform or covered platform
operator for the sale or provision of any product or service,” (b)
“constitute nascent or potential competition to the covered platform or
covered platform operator for the sale or provision of any product or
service,” (c) “enhance or increase the covered platform’s or covered
platform operator’s market position with respect to the sale or provision
of any product or service,” and (d) “enhance or increase the covered
platform’s or covered platform operator’s ability to maintain its market
position with respect to the sale or provision of any product or service
offered on or directly related to the covered platform.”204

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
204 S. 3197, 117th Cong. (2021).
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The legislation also specifies that competition for the sale of any
product or service includes competition for a user’s attention.205
Additionally, the legislation clarifies that an acquisition resulting in access
to additional data, without more, may enhance or increase the market
position of a covered platform or the covered platform’s ability to maintain
its market position.206
b. ANALYSIS OF THE PLATFORM ACT
This legislation would shift the burden of proof to the dominant
technology platforms by changing the default presumption.207 Now,
instead of presuming an acquisition to be legal and requiring the antitrust
enforcement agencies to prove otherwise, certain acquisitions by covered
platforms would be presumed illegal, unless the platform could show
otherwise.208 Covered platforms engaging in acquisitions would be
required to show that the companies they acquire are not direct
competitors, nascent competitors, or potential competitors and that their
acquisitions would not facilitate the acquirer's maintenance of or increase
in market power.209 Additionally, the standard of proof for the covered

Id.
Id.
207 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18.
208 S. 3197; 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
209 S. 3197.
205
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platforms would be clear and convincing evidence, a rigorous standard
requiring proof that “a particular fact is substantially more likely than not
to be true.”210
In court, the antitrust enforcement agencies would no longer have to
present extensive evidence of the dominant technology platform’s
relevant product market, geographic market, and market concentration.211
Thus, the agencies would no longer be tied to the use of the Hypothetical
Monopolist Test, HHI scores, and other economic data measures.212
Instead, a merger resulting in any increase in market power to a dominant
technology platform would be deemed illegal.213
Because the platforms engaging in acquisitions have easier access to
their own plans and financial data, they are more equipped to present
necessary evidence in defense of their acquisition plans, unlike the
current system whereby the antitrust enforcement agencies are required to
present the bulk of the necessary evidence.214 This would greatly simplify
the process of merger review, allowing the antitrust enforcement agencies
to adequately review merger plans and to challenge mergers without fear
of imminent failure in court.

Id.; Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof in Legal Proceedings, JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/lawsuits-and-the-court-process/evidentiarystandards-and-burdens-of-proof/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2021).
211 S. 3197.
212See supra Part III.
213 S. 3197.
214 See supra Part III.
210
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The proposal also addresses the issues associated with determining the
market share of a multi-sided digital platform. Digital platforms’ main
source of “currency” on the user side, rather than money, is the access to
data it gains through reaching more users.215 By expanding the concept of
market power to include user attention and access to data, courts will be
able to more accurately determine the extent to which a merger will
increase a dominant technology platform’s power.216
This legislation could also help address the competitive harms
previously mentioned—the decline in innovation and inadequate privacy
protections. First, by prohibiting covered platforms from acquiring new
start-ups that pose actual or potential competitive threats, start-up
companies will be given greater opportunities for their ideas to be realized.
Preventing these acquisitions will likely help to undo the “kill zone” that
has been created by GAFA, incentivizing venture capital investment in
technology start-ups.217 With increased funding for start-up companies
and more opportunity to grow without death by acquisition, start-ups will
have greater potential to reach scale and become viable competitors in the
technology market.218

Kill Zone, supra note 9, at 2; see also IMF Report, supra note 36, at 25.
S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
217 Kill Zone, supra note 9, at 3.
218 Id.
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This legislation could also incentivize digital platforms to offer greater
privacy protections because the Platform Act treats data and user attention
like currency, in a sense, dominant platforms will be mostly prohibited
from acquiring smaller firms in attempts to gain greater access to data.219
Additionally, as start-up firms survive and grow without being acquired
and subsequently killed off or neutralized, they will provide competitive
pressure that will likely spur greater privacy protections.220 With increased
competitive pressure, dominant platforms will be required to hear and
respond to customer demand for increased privacy protections, no longer
able to “erode consumer privacy without prompting a response from the
market.”221
Despite its potential to benefit the digital economy, this legislation
sparks concerns as well. First, the Platform Act excludes acquisitions
valued at less than $50 million from its coverage.222 According to the
House Judiciary Report, GAFA has been actively engaging in
acquisitions valued at less than $50 million, in addition to those valued in
the billions.223 By excusing these smaller, yet significant, acquisitions, the
Platform Act could fail to adequately prevent killer acquisitions and

S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 51; see also UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION
supra note 52, at 50.
221 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
222 S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
223 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 406–450.
219
220

,

2022]

Killer Acquisitions

103

acquisitions of nascent competitive threats. Instead, this type of
legislation could cause dominant technology platforms to become even
more defensive, incentivizing them to more rigorously scout out and
acquire start-ups while they are small, successfully avoiding the need to
comply with the Platform Act and simultaneously undermining its goals.
As previously mentioned, GAFA’s immense access to data has enabled it
to identify and acquire nascent competitors very early in their
development.224 This legislation could simply reinforce such behavior,
ultimately making it impossible for start-up companies to enter the
market without an immediate takeover.
c. THE PLATFORM ACT AS APPLIED TO FACEBOOK’S
ACQUISITIONS OF INSTAGRAM AND WHATSAPP
In addition, the Platform Act may be too narrowly tailored to GAFA
as it stands today. The Platform Act appears to be focused solely on
preventing the largest technology platforms from gaining more power, such
that it fails to adequately address the fact that Google, Apple, Facebook,
and Amazon also obtained the power they already have through these
anticompetitive acquisitions.225 This concern

may be understood more

clearly by applying the Platform Act to the previously discussed Facebook

224
225

Id. at 44.
S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021).
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acquisitions. While Facebook would certainly qualify as “covered
platform” today, it is not clear that the Platform Act would have prevented
the Instagram and WhatsApp acquisitions, had it been in place at the
time.226
i. Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram
If the Platform Act had been law at the time of Facebook’s
acquisition of Instagram, the merger would likely still have been allowed
because Facebook would not have qualified as a covered platform at the
time.227 By the end of 2011, Facebook had 179 million actively monthly
users in North America.228 However, it did not yet have a market
capitalization of $600 billion, nor did it have $600 billion of net annual
sales.229 Despite these numerical shortcomings, every other aspect of the

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 92; Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users in United
States and Canada as of Third Quarter of 2021, STATISTICA (July 28,
2022),https://www.statista.com/statistics/247614/number-of-monthly-activefacebook-users-worldwide/; Salvador Rodriguez, Facebook Closes Above $1 Trillion Market
Cap for the First Time, CNBC (June 28, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/28/facebook-hits-trillion-dollar-market-cap-for-firsttime.html.
Facebook would qualify as a covered platform in 2021 because it has over 50 million
U.S.-based monthly active users, its market capitalization is in excess of $600 billion,
and it is a critical trading partner for the sale or provision of social media services.
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2021, STATISTICA (July 28, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/247614/numberof-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/.
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acquisition would have fallen under the control of the Platform Act:
Facebook would certainly have been deemed a critical trading partner for
the provision of social media services;230 the acquisition did not qualify for
the enumerated exceptions in Clayton § 7A(c) because Facebook was
required to file a notification of the transaction;231 and Instagram was
purchased for $1 billion, which surpassed the Platform Act’s exception for
acquired stock or assets worth less than $50 million.232 It also is likely that
Facebook would not have been able to meet the Platform Act’s burden of
proof, showing by clear and convincing evidence that Instagram was not
a competitor for the provision of social media services. Competition, as
defined by the Platform Act, includes competition for user attention.233
Even though Facebook and Instagram’s models were different—one
being web-based and the other being a photo-sharing app—they most
certainly competed for user attention in general social media services.234
Facebook also would likely have had a very difficult time arguing that the

27, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277229/facebooks-annual-revenue-andnet-income/Tomio Geron, Facebook’s $5 Billion IPO Filing: $3.7 Billion in 2011 Revenue,
FORBES (Feb 1, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/02/01/facebooks-5-billion-ipofiling-3-7-billion-in-2011-revenue/?sh=455473d331a8.
230 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 92.
231 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2021).
232 Id. at 7
.
233 S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
234 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 7.
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acquisition of Instagram would not enhance its market position. Because
access to data alone can enhance a platform’s market position and
Instagram had 100 million users by the time of the transaction’s closing,235
Facebook most certainly gained access to data through the acquisition.
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram allowed it to gain immense
market power while simultaneously avoiding competition.236 Additionally,
Facebook likely would not have been able to meet the Platform Act’s
required showings. Despite these facts, under the Platform Act,
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram would likely still have been successful,
because Facebook did not qualify as a covered platform at the time.237
ii. Facebook’s Acquisition of WhatsApp
The results of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp would have
been very similar to those of its acquisition of Instagram. By the end of
2014, Facebook had 208 million active monthly users in North America,
almost certainly surpassing the 50 million United States-based user
requirement of the Platform Act.238 However, Facebook still did not have
a market capitalization of $600 billion at this time, nor did it have net

S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 155.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 137.
237 S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021).
238 Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users in United States and Canada as of Third Quarter of
2021, STATISTICA (July 28, 2022),
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annual sales of $600 billion.239 Despite these shortcomings, every other
aspect of the acquisition would have fallen under the control of the
Platform Act.240 Once again, Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp did not
qualify for an exception under Clayton § 7A(c) because Facebook was
required to file a notification statement for the transaction.241 Facebook
was certainly a critical trading partner for the provision of social media
services.242 And WhatsApp was purchased for $19 billion, greatly
surpassing the exception in the Platform Act for assets or stock valued
below $50 million.243
Again, were Facebook required to comply with the Platform Act’s
requirements, it likely would not have been successful. Facebook
potentially could have argued that WhatsApp did not compete with it for
the provision of services, because WhatsApp focused on providing
messaging services.244 However, a court would likely find that WhatsApp
competed with Facebook’s Messenger app for user attention.245

Facebook’s Revenue and Net Income from 2007 to 2020, STATISTICA (July 27, 2022),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277229/facebooks-annual-revenue-and-netincome/; Market Cap History of Meta (Facebook) from 2012 to 2020, COMPANIES MARKET
CAP (July 5, 2022), 7, 2021).https://companiesmarketcap.com/facebook/marketcap/.
240 S. 3197, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021).
241 Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
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Additionally, Facebook would have had a difficult time arguing that
WhatsApp was not a potential competitor, because WhatsApp’s mobilemessaging app was gaining popularity so quickly, a likely next step would
have been for WhatsApp to venture into social media services.246
Lastly, similar to Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram, Facebook
’s acquisition of WhatsApp undoubtedly allowed it greater access to
data.247 By the end of 2013, WhatsApp had

400 million monthly active

users, providing Facebook with data that enhanced its market position.248
Even though Facebook would likely have failed to prove that this
acquisition would not be anticompetitive, the transaction would have been
approved because Facebook did not qualify as a “covered platform” at the
time.249
It is important to note that the Platform Act was drafted with
the 2021 digital market’s dominant platforms in mind.250 If the Platform
Act had been drafted in 2012, it likely would not have required such a high
market capitalization and net annual sales rate in its definition of “covered

Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 92, 136.
248 Number of Monthly Active WhatsApp Users Worldwide from April 2013 to March 2020,
STATISTICA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/260819/number-of-monthly-activewhatsapp-users/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2021).
249 S. 3197, 117th Cong. (2021).
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platform.” Nevertheless, the boundaries of the Platform Act raise
concerns as to its ultimate goals. If the goal of the act is simply to prevent
GAFA from gaining more power through the use of anticompetitive
acquisitions, it will likely succeed. However, if the goal of the Platform Act
is to prevent future dominant platforms from rising to the level of GAFA
through the use of killer acquisitions and acquisitions of nascent
competitive threats, it is unclear whether the legislation will accomplish
this goal.
As previously discussed, given the current conditions of the digital
market, it would be extremely difficult for a new entrant to gain scale in
the digital economy.251 Network effects, switching costs, data
accumulation, and economies of scale have made it so that new entrants
cannot compete with GAFA.252 However, if laws like the Platform Act—
which limit GAFA’s ability to acquire new entrants—are enacted, it could
create room in the digital market for new platforms to enter and grow. If
new entrants successfully develop into competitive forces in the market,
nothing will prevent them from using killer acquisitions and acquisitions
of nascent competitive threats to gain scale.253 Only once they become big

See supra Part II.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40–46; IMF Report, supra note 36, at 24.
253 See supra note 249.
251
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enough and powerful enough to qualify as “covered platforms” will their
use of anticompetitive acquisitions be limited.254 Thus, it seems that if new
legislation is to prevent future dominant platforms from gaining power
through the use of anticompetitive acquisitions, the definition of “covered
platform” should be expanded to include the “Facebooks” of the early
2010s.
d. ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PLATFORM ACT
Many economists have expressed concern about the idea of new
antitrust legislation that would establish a “bright-line” presumption
against acquisitions by dominant platforms.255 Republican representative
Ken Buck, in his response report to the House Judiciary Committee’s
findings, The Third Way, stated that “Congress must be cautious not to
establish a new bright line presumption that Big Tech should be banned
from making any and all future acquisitions.”256 Representative Buck
explains that such bright-line rules could harm start-up companies because
many rely on developing a successful product and then subsequently
selling the product to a larger company.257 Representative Buck also opines
that a bright-line presumption would further discourage venture capital
investment because without the possibility of acquisition by a larger

Id.
BUCK REPORT, supra note 24, at 15; see also Kill Zone, supra note 9, at 32–33.
256 BUCK REPORT, supra note 24, at 15.
257 Id.
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company upon the development of a successful project, many investors
would be disincentivized to invest.258 While the Platform Act would not
ban all acquisitions by dominant technology platforms, it is clear that a
tension exists between preventing harmful acquisitions and encouraging
acquisitions that introduce new technology into the market.259 Other
economists have expressed similar concerns and offered opinions as to
how this delicate line might be toed.
In their article “Kill Zone,” Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales, and
Sai Krishna Kamepalli argue that simply preventing mergers by dominant
technology platforms will leave users split between multiple platforms.260
As discussed in Part II, mergers by dominant technology platforms
“immediately transmit superior technology to everybody.”261 Dominant
platforms make the technology of a newly acquired company compatible
with their pre-existing technology, thereby giving all the dominant
platform’s users immediate access to the new technology.262 While this
process can be harmful in that it eliminates the incentive for early app
developers to adopt apps, it is beneficial in that it creates consumer
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260 Kill Zone, supra note 9, at 32.
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welfare, automatically giving consumers access to new technology which
becomes interconnected with their existing profiles on the dominant
platforms.263 If dominant firms are no longer able to acquire new entrants,
an increase in technology platform providers will likely result in consumers
being split between multiple platforms.264 For example, because of
interoperability between Facebook and Instagram, users can share a photo
on Instagram and Facebook simultaneously. If platforms become divided,
such efficiencies will likely decline.265
The House Judiciary Committee also expressed concern that digital
markets have become so prone to tipping that they are “no longer
contestable by new entrants.”266 Even with new legislation limiting further
acquisitions by dominant technology platforms, it is likely that such
platforms have become so powerful, new entrants will still not be able to
adequately compete.267 Because of network effects and switching costs,
consumers will be hesitant to switch to a newer platform and entrants will
struggle to be successful in the digital market.268
Both the authors of “Kill Zone” and the members of the House
Judiciary Committee recommend that an interoperability standard be

Id. at 32–35.
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adopted to address these issues.269 They argue that an interoperability
requirement would “allow competing social networking platforms to
interconnect with dominant firms to ensure that users can communicate
across services” and would break down the power of network effects “by
allowing new entrants to take advantage of existing network effects” at the
market level, rather than the company level.270 The authors of “Kill Zone”
believe that such a requirement would also restore the “proper incentive
to innovate.”271 Because all platforms and consumers would have access
to the “externalities associated with the whole network…the better
product [would] always prevail.”272 The power of switching costs on
consumers would also decrease.273 Consumers would be free to adopt new
platforms, while simultaneously maintaining their pre-existing networks.274
Thus, to adequately address the competitive issues created by
underdeterrence of anticompetitive acquisitions, new legislation must
prevent further acquisitions by dominant platforms from taking place,
while simultaneously reinvigorating new entry into the digital economy.275
It is likely that the inclusion of interoperability requirements in the

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 384–86; Kill Zone, supra note 9, at 31–35.
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Platform Act, or the establishment of such standards through additional
legislation, would give the digital economy the boost it needs, increasing
incentives to innovate, leading to better competitive balance.
V.

CONCLUSION

Merger law, as currently construed by federal courts, fails to
prevent dominant technology platforms from engaging in killer
acquisitions and acquisitions of nascent competitive threats. The burden
of proof placed on the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission is too demanding and often unattainable, creating an
environment where the agencies are unlikely or unable to challenge
acquisitions by GAFA.
Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon have used these
anticompetitive acquisitions to gain power, neutralize competitive threats,
and drive new entrants from the market. With less competition in the
digital market, incentives to innovate have declined, enabling GAFA to
continually gain power through the abuse of consumer data privacy. If
merger law does not address these issues, GAFA will continue gaining
power, decreasing competition, and harming both entrepreneurs and
consumers.
Merger law must be reformed so that it can both limit the
dominant technology platforms’ uses of anticompetitive acquisitions and
address the competitive harms created by such acquisitions.

